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We examine the relationship between creditor protection, law reform and credit
expansion using longitudinal data for four OECD countries between 1970 and 2005.
By decomposing the different elements of creditor protection, we show that civil
law countries (France and Germany) have developed a high level of protection for
creditors in the form of controls over the management of debtor ﬁrms, while
common law countries (UK and USA) have arrived at a high degree of protection in
relation to secured creditors’ contractual rights over ﬁrms’ assets. Using panel caus-
ality tests and dynamic panel data modelling, we show that laws strengthening cred-
itors’ control over debtor ﬁrms in these four countries had a long-term positive effect
on the expansion of private credit, while reforms increasing secured creditors’ rights
had a negative effect. We explore the implications of our ﬁndings for legal origin
theory and the varieties of capitalism approach.
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1. Introduction
The idea that law matters for effective capitalist development can be traced back to the writ-
ings of Weber (2013). Comparing the experience of industrializing countries of Western
Europe with other countries, he concluded that a rational legal system is a precondition for
the emergence of capitalism. This perspective treats the legal system as an endowment,
created by a ﬁxed investment, which determines the path of development ‘without itself
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being subject to change’ (Milhaupt and Pistor, 2008, pp. 18–22). North (1990) presents a
similar viewpoint. He has argued that rich nations are those which have succeeded in
forming institutions which are able to protect property rights and provide an environment
for the enforcement of contracts. Less developed nations lack these institutions.
The foundationalworks of La Porta et al. (1998) and the subsequent analyses by this group and
others have infused a strong quantitative ﬂavour to the study of law as ‘endowment’ (see La Porta
et al., 1997, 1998, 2008; Botero et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2007). In constructing quantitative
measures of legal rules, La Porta et al. (henceforth ‘LLSV’) mostly used binary variables (0, 1) to
capture the quality of types of law protecting the interests of shareholders, creditors and workers.
Lele and Siems (2007), extending and modifying LLSV’s methodology, refer to these data coding
techniques as ‘leximetric’. A large literature, spanning the legal and economic research ﬁelds, has
since developed, extending and modifying these methods (see Siems, 2014).
A further feature of LLSV’s approach was their classiﬁcation of countries according to their
‘legal origin’. By this, LLSV referred to the distinction between the English common law and the
mainly French- and German-inﬂuenced civil law. LLSV divided the civil law world into systems
of French, German and Scandinavian origin. Through various cross-sectional regression studies
of their leximetric data, LLSV concluded that English common law systems were more market-
friendly: they provide higher levels of shareholder and creditor protection, and this legal support
has led to an increased level of credit market development (La Porta et al., 2008).
The legal origin literature has connected with other contemporary analyses which claim to
show that ﬁnancial development promotes economic growth (Levine, 1997). The conclusion
drawn from this wider literature is that legal origin matters for economic development. Some
studies claim to have found empirical evidence showing that common law countries grow
faster than civil law countries (Mahoney, 2001). The current consensus is that this claim
has not yet been made out (La Porta et al., 2008; Klerman et al., 2011). Nevertheless, legal
origin theory has been advanced as a superior explanatory model to that provided by the var-
ieties of capitalism (VOC) approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001): thus it has been suggested that
supporters of the VOC model, having searched in vain for an ‘objective measure of different
types’, need have ‘looked no further than legal origins’ (La Porta et al., 2008, p. 303).
In this article, we re-examine the claims that ‘law matters’ for ﬁnancial development and
that common law systems are, on the whole, more protective of ﬁnancial interests than civil
law ones. We focus on the issue of creditor protection. While considerable attention has been
paid, within the corporate governance literature, to growing shareholder inﬂuence over man-
agers and to claims that market economies are converging on a type of shareholder-centric
corporate law (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001), the relationship between creditors and
the ﬁrm is arguably of equal importance to understanding the legal underpinning of the busi-
ness enterprise (Deakin, 2012), while bank-based lending, which is legally structured by in-
solvency (or ‘corporate bankruptcy’) law, is by nomeans conﬁned in its importance to systems
characterized as having ‘coordinated markets’ (Wood, 1997).
Djankov et al. (2007), building on the analysis in La Porta et al. (1998), construct a lon-
gitudinal data set of creditor rights in 129 countries over the period 1978–2003, to test the
claim that insolvency law impacts on the extent of private credit in an economy, that is, the
scale of lending to ﬁrms by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions. They ﬁnd that improve-
ments in creditor protection are correlated with higher ratios of private credit to GDP and
that the common law provides superior protection for creditors than the civil law.
However, their analysis is not the last word on the subject because the legal data set they
2 S. Deakin et al.
rely on does not contain all relevant variables of interest. In this article, we use a more exten-
sive legal index which allows us to code for the differences between distinct forms of creditor
control over debtor ﬁrms and their assets. We then focus our analysis on four individual
country cases—France, Germany, the UK and the USA—in a way which enables us to
provide detailed data on patterns of legal change, something which is much harder to
achieve when data from over 100 countries are analysed as in Djankov et al. (2007).
Our analysis shows a number of things. First, insolvency law reform is much more
common than Djankov et al. (2007), who refer to the ‘stability’ of this area of law, suggest.
Second, we demonstrate that the effects of the law differ according to which type of creditor
protection predominates in a given country. Third, we show that the strengthening of certain
types of creditor rights can be negative for the growth of private credit.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of
legal origin theory and of the current state of methodological debates in this area. Section 3
outlines our legal data, and Section 4 sets out the econometric analysis. Section 5 discusses the
ﬁndings, placing them in the context of the theoretical development of the legal origin hypoth-
esis, and of its relation to the VOC approach. Section 6 concludes.
2. Legal origins: theory and evidence
There are two inter-linked claims driving the legal origin literature, which can be referred to in
terms of (i) the ‘quality of law’ or ‘lawmatters’ hypothesis, and (ii) the ‘legal origin’ hypothesis
in its strict or narrow sense (see Armour et al., 2009a).
(i)Quality of law. This is the claim that legal rules shape economic outcomes according to
how far they support market-based economic activity as suggested in new institutional eco-
nomics (North, 1990). It is argued that legal protection of the interests of the shareholders
and creditors will increase the ﬂow of investments and enhance the availability of external
ﬁnance to ﬁrms (La Porta et al., 1997, 2008).
(ii) Legal origin. This is the claim that the quality of legal institutions varies systematically
with the ‘origin’ of a country’s legal system—that is, whether it falls into the Anglo-American
‘common law’, or French, German or Scandinavian ‘civil law’ systems (Djankov et al., 2003;
La Porta et al., 2008).
LLSV and others have asserted the superiority of the common law by reference to the so-
called ‘adaptability’ and ‘political’ channels (Botero et al., 2004). The ‘adaptability’ argument
is related to the process of framing new rules. Judges, it is argued, are principally responsible
for interpreting and developing the law in common law countries; this ability to shape the law
on a case-by-case basis helps to make legal regulation more adaptable to changing circum-
stances. In civil law countries, in contrast, judges are bound by explicit statutes and codes,
leaving them with little discretion. The result is that civil law systems suffer from excessive
rigidity, as changes may only be made by ﬁts and starts through legislation.
The ‘political’ channel focuses on the supposedly greater independence enjoyed by the
judiciary in common law systems (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). According to this view,
common law judges are less susceptible to inﬂuence by the legislature and are better able to
protect individual property rights from encroachment by the state. In contrast, in a civil law
system, the legislature and executive are said to have greater control over legal institutions,
including judicial appointment, selection and tenure. Hence, the civil law judiciary is less
able to protect individual property rights from the predation by the state.
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The mechanisms by which legal origins exert their inﬂuence through the ‘adaptability’ and
‘political’ channels have been questioned in legal scholarship. For example, under current
French and German practice, judges do interpret the law through concepts such as good
faith; English judges, on the other hand, have less scope than they once did to develop the
law, in view of the development of highly detailed and speciﬁc statutory interventions in
areas, which include insolvency law (Ahlering and Deakin, 2007).
The methodological base of legal origin theory has also been challenged on a number of
grounds (see Armour et al., 2009a). To some degree, these are criticisms of leximetric coding
methods in general. Any attempt to put measurements on legal rules is going to be subject to mul-
tiple objections. Laws are open to many interpretations, and subjective judgments come into play
in the choice of variables, the aggregation of scores and the weighting given (or not) to particular
indicators. Leximetric indices, while they may tell us much about the formal or de jure content of
legal rules, cannot tell us anything directly about their implementation or reception.
These are all valid methodological criticisms, but they do not lead inexorably to the con-
clusion that leximetric data coding is inevitably defective or illegitimate as a technique. The
leximetric method can be improved by the sourcing of data to original legal texts and by trans-
parency in the weighting and aggregation of data, while appropriate econometric techniques,
coupled with the use of complementary data sets on institutional effectiveness, can help to
minimize the risk that legal indices are simply coding for ‘law on the books’ as opposed to
‘law in action’ (see Buchanan et al., 2013).
The data set we are using here, the CBR Creditor Protection Index1, is one of several con-
structed at the Centre for Business Research at Cambridge with a view to addressing some of
the objections raised by legal scholars and others to the initial studies of LLSV and their col-
leagues (see Siems, 2014). The CBR data sets differ from LLSVs in considering a wider range
of values for legal variables.Much of the coding undertaken by LLSV uses binary variables (0,
1): for the existence of a given rule, the code is 1, otherwise it is 0. This procedure does not take
into account the possibility of ambiguity or uncertainty in the interpretation of a legal provi-
sion. In the CBR data, intermediate values between 0 and 1 are generally used to capture more
of the complexity of legal rules. A further feature of the CBR data sets on creditor protection is
that they are more detailed than those used by LLSV, allowing a greater range of legal data to
be captured. Thus, the longitudinal index relied on by Djankov et al. (2007) to measure cred-
itor rights, following the template ﬁrst set out by La Porta et al. (2008), has only four indica-
tors in it. The CBR data set which we use here contains 44 indicators across three sub-indices,
each of which deals with a distinct area of creditor protection (Armour et al., 2009a).
3. Coding for varieties of creditor protection
3.1 Avoiding home-country bias
The creditor rights index constructed by La Porta et al. (1998) and applied to an extended
sample of countries by Djankov et al. (2007) contains four measures of the powers of
secured lenders: (i) whether a creditor can restrict or prevent the debtor ﬁrm ﬁling for reorgan-
ization and thereby achieving protection from claims; (ii) whether secured creditors have the
right to seize assets given as collateral once the bankruptcy process begins (the ‘automatic stay’
1 Available online at: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/research-projects/completed-projects/
law-ﬁnance-development/ (last accessed on November 27, 2015).
4 S. Deakin et al.
rule); (iii) whether secured creditors have priority over other creditors in claiming from the
proceeds of the liquidated ﬁrm; and (iv) whether an administrator, as opposed to the ﬁrm’s
management, is responsible for running the ﬁrm as it is being reorganized. These aspects of
corporate insolvency are signiﬁcant, but the La Porta et al. (1998) index neglects other means
by which the law may affect the relationship between creditors and ﬁrms. These include
minimum capital requirements and, more generally, capital maintenance rules which seek
to prevent depletion of the ﬁrm’s asset pool, in addition to rules placing the ﬁrm’s directors
under a duty to creditors as insolvency nears, and allowing a court to ‘pierce the veil’ of
corporate personality in order to avoid the partitioning of corporate assets in a which
defeats creditors’ claims (Finch, 2009).
In constructing a cross-national measure of creditor protection, it is in principle important to
code for rules of different types, and in particular to avoid an exclusive focus on the rights of
secured creditors, which because of their association with the common law can give rise to a
‘home-country bias’ in the coding process (Cools, 2005).Minimum capital rules have tradition-
ally been relied on to protect creditors in civil law countries, while the taking of non-possessory
security over the entire assets of the ﬁrm was originally an English law practice and remains in-
ﬂuenced by common law concepts (Wood, 2008). Jurisdictions derived from the French Code
civil have been slow to adopt concepts such as the set-off and commercial trust which have been
used to impart ﬂexibility to insolvency planning in systems derived from English law (Wood,
1997). Disregarding limited liability and separate corporate personality by piercing the veil in
insolvencies involving parent-subsidiaries relations and corporate groups is a well-established
practice in the USA, but has been controversial in the UK (Miller, 1998; Ottolenghi, 1990),
and has seen only limited use in civil law countries (Thompson, 1991).
Djankov et al. (2007) note that the period of their study, from the late 1970s to the
mid-2000s, was one of change in corporate insolvency law, but the scores in their index
show relatively little change over time and they refer to this area of law being relatively
stable. This result suggests that their choice of indicators excluded some relevant variables
of interest. The similar period covered by the CBR index, 1970–2005, was one in which in-
solvency law was changing rapidly as a result of factors including an increase in cross-border
and international insolvency proceedings (Westbrook, 2004) and the rise of a reorganization
and rescue culture in many countries (Belcher, 1997). Reforms made to the rehabilitation and
liquidation of companies at this time were not minor juridical adjustments, but reﬂected
economic pressures and changing social and political values (Uttamchandani, 2004).
3.2 Three types of creditor protection: debtor control, credit contracts
and insolvency procedures
The CBR index attempts to capture the complexity of insolvency law in this period of change
by dividing the generic category of creditor rights into three sub-categories which reﬂect the
distinct ways in which creditors may be protected by the law: debtor control, credit contracts
and insolvency procedures. Taken together, the different components of the index reﬂect the
ways in which creditors may be protected while the ﬁrm is still a going concern, as well as via
the reorganization process itself (Armour et al., 2009a).
(i)Debtor control. This part of the index (15 variables) refers to restrictions imposed on the
activities of ﬁrms while they are going concerns, with the aim of reducing the risk of default.
It focuses on transactions and operations by the shareholders and directors which may render
the company vulnerable to failure and may deprive creditors of access to all or part of the
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company’s assets (Armour and Bennett, 2003). It also takes into account remedies potentially
available to creditors. Included in the coding are provisions relating to the amount of
minimum capital required to start a ﬁrm, restrictions on the payment of dividends deﬁned
by reference to the ﬁrm’s capital, the rights of courts to pierce the corporate veil to protect
creditors, directors’ duties to take into account the interests of creditors, which can be particu-
larly important for the protection of unsecured creditors and public enforcement of directors’
liabilities in the event of insolvency through, among other things, disqualiﬁcation of directors
for wrongful trading. Finally, this sub-category includes provisions which are intended
to protect the collective nature of liquidation proceedings whose goal is to achieve equal
treatment of similarly situated creditors (McCormack, 2006) and to minimize the costs of
insolvency proceedings (Mevorach, 2011).
(ii) Credit contracts. This part of the index (10 variables) deals with the existence, feasibil-
ity and enforcement of ‘self-help’ mechanisms which creditors use to protect their interests.
They include laws which protect the ability to take various forms of security or collateral.
The variables covered include those relating to mortgages, ﬂoating charges, ﬁnancial collateral
and retention of title clauses; the enforcement of those interests through the seizure and sale of
assets; the appointment of receivers without a court order and insolvency set-off clauses which
entrench secured creditors’ interests. How the law recognizes and ranks such claims is at the
core of its role in replacing ‘the free-for-all attendant upon the pursuit of individual claims by
different creditors’ (Goode, 2011) with a regime in which creditors’ rights and remedies are
coordinated and a wasteful ‘race to collect’ avoided. The rise of new and complex ﬁnancial
instruments available on the market and the contested status of proprietary claims in an in-
creasingly globalized legal environment have been reshaping this aspect of insolvency law in
the period of our study (see; Jackson, 1982; Mokal, 2001; Westbrook, 2004; Schillig, 2014).
(iii) Insolvency procedures. This sub-index (19 variables) concerns the procedures govern-
ing corporate reorganizations and liquidations. It deals with the rules relating to the triggering
of insolvency (or ‘corporate bankruptcy’) proceedings by shareholders and directors; whether
creditors can ﬁle for insolvency proceedings on a balance-sheet basis, which may make the
ﬁrm more vulnerable to being broken-up; whether a single creditor can initiate liquidation
proceedings; the availability to the ﬁrm of a stay or moratorium in liquidation and rehabilita-
tion proceedings, deﬂecting creditors’ claims; whether directors can retain control during
rehabilitation proceedings; whether secured creditors alone, unsecured creditors, shareholders
or courts have the power to appoint a bankruptcy trustee or administrator; rules on voting
over the ﬁrm’s exit from bankruptcy and priorities between different creditor groups in
liquidation and rehabilitation proceedings.
3.3 Different national pathways
Coded legal data need to be understood against the backdrop of the long-run evolution of na-
tional legal systems if the trends made visible by leximetric coding are to be properly contextua-
lized. Laws protecting creditors’ rights reﬂect distinct pathways to industrial development aswell
as the inﬂuence of political values and legal cultures which inﬂuence drafting styles and may
frame judicial and statutory responses to changing business environments (Pistor, 2005).
Where insolvency law is perceived as a collectivized debt collection device, its aims tend to be
deﬁned in terms of creditor wealthmaximization (Jackson, 1986). However, other values can be
found underlying insolvency laws of different countries or the same country at different times,
including broader-based contractarian approaches (Korobkin, 1993) and communitarian ones
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(Warren, 1987; Gross, 1994). Jurisdictions change at varying speeds (Elliott, 2000) and those
responding more quickly to a ‘period of turbulence’ (Finch, 2009) may as a result become
models for others. Credit crunches, corporate scandals, stagnation in lending markets, global
or regional recessions and crises in particular corporate sectors are among the factors which
may generate legal change. There are numerous examples of cross-fertilization between legal
families, a recent example being the inﬂuence of the US Bankruptcy Code on the German
Insolvenzordnung (‘InsO’) reforms of the late 1990s, a process which nevertheless saw
Germany law retain major differences from the original US model (Eidenmüller, 2006).
In the period of our study between 1970 and 2005, the insolvency law of four leading in-
dustrial economies changed at different rates. Francewas one of the ﬁrst countries in theworld
to create a rescue regime, in the late 1960s, and a series of reforms since then have responded
to criticisms of the rigidity of the law from lenders and ﬁnancial institutions. French insolvency
law is nevertheless still imbuedwith the idea that the law should serve a ‘general interest’ rather
than just those of creditors. Decisions on reorganizations mostly rest with courts, with cred-
itors having relatively few powers (Dennis and Fox, 2004). This tendency reﬂects a republican
conception of the role of commercial law going back to the nineteenth century, which sees
corporate failure as a threat to public order as much as to private interests (Hautcoeur and
Di Martino, 2013).
Germany experienced a relatively late introduction of a statutory modern insolvency law
and rescue regime. Until 1999, the original legislation of 1877, itself heavily inﬂuenced by the
FrenchCode de commerce of 1807, was still mostly in force. Prior to the reforms of the 1990s,
informal arrangements had developed to allow ﬁrms to continue to trade with the consent of
secured creditors so that they could be sold as going concerns; this arrangement was forma-
lized by the new legislation. The aim of the insolvency code introduced in 1999 was wealth
maximization and ‘allowing the market to work’ (Balz, 1997), but creditors complained that
procedures remained complex and formalistic, and German companies began to make use of
English schemes of arrangement, which were deemed more ﬂexible.
In the USA, the nineteenth century was a period of ‘redeﬁnition of insolvency from sin to
risk, from moral failure to economic failure’ (Mann, 2002). US law inherited from the English
common law a ﬂexible approach to the recognition of creditors’ security interests. However,
departing from the original English model, American bankruptcy law developed distinct doc-
trines allowing incumbent owner-managers to trigger a protective reorganization procedure
before the company became insolvent, and granting ‘super-priority’ to new lenders during a
moratorium on claims. In the period of our study, there was little change to this model not-
withstanding rising numbers of large-scale corporate failures, which led to questioning of the
‘debtor in possession’ approach (Kilborn, 2009).
The English courts developed the notions of the lien, set-off, trust and mortgage to allow
for the creation of multiple and overlapping security interests over ﬁrm assets from an early
stage of the country’s industrial development (Dennis and Fox, 2004). However, since the
1980s there have been numerous legislative changes, some led by concern over the effects
on creditors of director misconduct, others driven by a perception that rules designed
mostly for closely held ﬁrms were not working well in the context of the liquidation of
large enterprises (Ratford and Smith, 1985). Legislation from the mid-1980s created new
rescue-orientated procedures, and in the early 2000s, there was a revision of creditors’ rank-
ings and a downgrading of the rights of secured lenders to trigger liquidation, making
rescue-orientated administration the procedure of choice (Dennis and Fox, 2004).
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These distinct trajectories map incompletely, at best, on to the typologies proposed by legal
origin theory. It is true that the path followed by English law was largely one developed by the
courts, which allowed the creation of new types of collateral over the assets of ﬁrms and devel-
oped remedies, which favoured the interests of secured creditors. Yet the USA, while also a
common law system, developed a mostly statute-led bankruptcy code which placed the inter-
ests of incumbent management ahead of those of creditors. The US model went on to inspire
various national versions of a ‘rescue culture’, with English law eventually being reshaped by
legislative interventions, its common law heritage notwithstanding. French law has historical-
ly downplayed creditors’ interests in a way which reﬂects a view of the ﬁrm as publicly ordered
and containing multiple interests. This perspective may be compatible with an understanding
of the civil law as paying limited regard to private property rights. However, the historical em-
phasis in French insolvency law on the preservation of the ﬁrm as a going concern, under the
supervision of the court, has much in common with the debtor-protective approach of US law.
Germany, although a civil law system initially inﬂuenced by the French Code de commerce,
went on to recognize secured creditors’ property rights in ways which approximated the
approach of English law.
3.4 Trends in the data, 1970–2005
We are now in a position to describe the trends in the four countries as indicated by our
leximetric data. In Table 1, we present quinquennial averages of the overall index and sub-
indices for the four countries under study. The scores are averages of all the relevant variables
and assume the range of values between 0 and 1, with higher scores indicating more protection
for creditors. Through simple averaging, we also calculate the quinquennial averages for
creditor protection across the common law group (UK and USA) and the civil law group
(France and Germany). These data are plotted on to a number of diagrams (Figures 1–8).
In the ﬁrst quinquennium (1970–1974), Germany had the highest level of aggregate cred-
itor protection closely followed by UK and USA, while France hadmuch lower levels of overall
protection. Subsequently, the level of creditor protection strengthened in all countries. In the
process, France converged on US levels of protection, while the UK overtook Germany.
However, in the last period (2000–2005), Germany regained its leading position, thanks to
the enactment of the InsO law (Figure 1). Our aggregation at the level of legal origin shows
that in each ﬁve-year period, creditor protection was higher in the common law countries than
in the civil law countries (Figure 2). However, the civil law group showed a tendency to catch
up in different quinquennia; during 2000–2005, the two groups have around the same level of
overall creditor protection (0.61).
When we look more closely at different sub-categories of creditor protection, we can see
that in the ﬁeld of debtor control Germany has the highest degree of protection throughout the
period of our study (Figure 3). Thanks to the German score, the civil law group has been most
highly placed in this aspect of creditor protection throughout the period under review.
However, the common law group can be observed catching up, as both the German and
French debtor control scores show a slow declining trend since the mid-1980s, while the
UK shows a steady increase throughout the period and the USA shows a similar tendency
from 1985 to 1989 (Figures 3 and 4).
In the ﬁeld of creditor contract protection, the USA initially had the highest score; subse-
quently the UK took that position while Germany and France remained far behind the two
common law countries (Figure 5). The common law group has higher scores throughout
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the period of study, but there is a tendency for the civil law group to catch up, thanks mostly to
legal changes in France throughout the period since 1975–1979 (Figure 6).
In relation to creditor protection in insolvency procedures, the UK maintained the leading
position, far above the others, in all the ﬁve-year periods between 1970 and 1999. Initially,
Germany had the weakest creditor protection relating to insolvency procedures, but more re-
cently, as a result of the InsO law, it has reached the level of protection provided in the UK.
France also strengthened its insolvency procedures in favour of creditors in the 1980s and
1990s, and the USA made some minor changes in the 1970s (Figure 7). In view of all these
reforms, since the early 1980s, the insolvency law regime in the civil law countries can be
Table 1 Creditor protection in four OECD countries, 1970–2005 (period averages)
Period and series France Germany UK USA Common law Civil law
Debtor control laws
1970–1974 0.47 0.77 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.62
1975–1979 0.47 0.77 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.62
1980–1984 0.49 0.83 0.42 0.31 0.37 0.66
1985–1989 0.46 0.88 0.50 0.31 0.40 0.67
1990–1994 0.46 0.88 0.57 0.45 0.51 0.67
1995–1999 0.46 0.85 0.57 0.48 0.53 0.66
2000–2005 0.45 0.77 0.55 0.48 0.51 0.61
Credit contracts laws
1970–1974 0.38 0.65 0.67 0.83 0.75 0.52
1975–1979 0.38 0.65 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.52
1980–1984 0.45 0.65 0.81 0.73 0.77 0.55
1985–1989 0.48 0.65 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.57
1990–1994 0.49 0.65 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.57
1995–1999 0.58 0.66 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.62
2000–2005 0.58 0.67 0.77 0.73 0.75 0.63
Insolvency procedures
1970–1974 0.45 0.46 0.56 0.49 0.53 0.46
1975–1979 0.45 0.46 0.56 0.49 0.53 0.46
1980–1984 0.45 0.46 0.56 0.51 0.54 0.46
1985–1989 0.53 0.46 0.58 0.51 0.55 0.50
1990–1994 0.53 0.46 0.60 0.51 0.56 0.50
1995–1999 0.55 0.50 0.60 0.51 0.56 0.52
2000–2005 0.54 0.62 0.63 0.51 0.57 0.58
Aggregate creditor protection
1970–1974 0.44 0.58 0.55 0.52 0.53 0.51
1975–1979 0.44 0.58 0.58 0.52 0.55 0.51
1980–1984 0.46 0.60 0.60 0.52 0.56 0.53
1985–1989 0.50 0.61 0.63 0.52 0.57 0.56
1990–1994 0.50 0.61 0.65 0.54 0.60 0.56
1995–1999 0.54 0.62 0.65 0.55 0.60 0.58
2000–2005 0.53 0.68 0.66 0.55 0.61 0.61
Source: CBR Creditor Protection Index for the UK, USA, Germany, France and India: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/
research/research-projects/completed-projects/law-ﬁnance-development (last accessed on October 29, 2015).
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seen to have begun to converge with that in the common law (read UK), and by 2000–2005 it
had overtaken it (Figure 8).
4. Does creditor protection matter for credit market development?
We now turn to examine whether ‘law matters’ that is, whether a country with higher creditor
protection experiences an increased volume of credit ﬂows from banks and other ﬁnancial in-
stitutions to business ﬁrms. In principle, the effects of creditor protection laws could go either
way. The granting of collateral to the ﬁrm’s lenders may result in a loss of control for incum-
bent managers and the elimination of shareholders’ claims over the ﬁrm’s capital. Thus laws
which grant secured lenders extensive rights to seize assets and instigate a reorganization
Figure 2 Aggregate creditor protection by legal origin, 1970–2005.
Figure 1 Aggregate creditor protection by country, 1970–2005.
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without the consent of management or shareholders may reduce demand for this type of credit
(Lee et al., 2007; Acharya et al., 2009). On the other hand, such laws could help stimulate
lending by banks and ﬁnancial institutions by providing themwith protection against the con-
sequences of ﬁrm failure, in particular where their security interests are ranked ahead of claims
of unsecured creditors (Houston et al., 2010).
Figure 3 Debtor control laws by country, 1970–2005.
Figure 4 Debtor control laws by legal origin, 1970–2005.
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These hypotheses can be tested by regressing our legal indices against measures of
the extent of lending by banks and ﬁnancial institutions to business ﬁrms. To capture the
latter, we rely on two widely used indicators of credit market development, namely domestic
Figure 5 Credit contracts laws by country, 1970–2005.
Figure 6 Credit contracts laws by legal origin, 1970–2005.
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credit provided by the banking sector (as a percentage of GDP) and domestic credit to the
private sector (as a percentage of GDP). Domestic credit to private sector is a wider category
than bank-derived credit which includes ﬁnancial resources in the form of purchases of
Figure 7 Insolvency procedures by country, 1970–2005.
Figure 8 Insolvency procedures by legal origin, 1970–2005.
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non-equity securities, trade credits and other accounts receivable. These data are drawn from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.2
Periodic (mostly quinquennial) averages of the indicators of credit market development are
plotted in Figures 9 and 10. For both indicators, the USA maintained a leading position
throughout the period of study, while UK remained the least protective up to 1990. The
two measures of private credit are closely related and show similar trends and largely the
same values for some of the countries.
Figure 9 Bank credit–GDP ratio by country, 1970–2005.
Figure 10 Private credit–GDP ratio by country, 1970–2005.
2 Available online at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators (last accessed on November 27, 2015).
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4.1 Tests of panel causality
The ﬁrst question to consider in our econometric analysis is how far higher levels of private
credit in the common law group are due to their laws on creditor protection. To address this
question, we use panel causality tests and dynamic panel data modelling. These methods allow
us to examine the causal impact of creditor protection laws on credit market development in-
dicators. To control for the level of economic activity of a country, we use real GDP in pur-
chasing power parity constant dollars, deﬂated by population, a similar approach to that of
Djankov et al. (2007) which enables us to compare our results with theirs. The relevant data
are also drawn from the World Development Indicators. As each of the countries is a devel-
oped market economy with a high level of general respect for legal rules, we do not include a
separate control for differences in the extent of legal enforcement, as some other leximetic
studies have done (see Armour et al., 2009b).
To understand whether the direction of causality runs from creditor protection to credit
expansion or the opposite (reverse causation), or both (mutual causation), we use a panel
VAR (Vector-Autoregressive) Granger causality test. VAR and VEC tests would have been in-
appropriate to the initial studies carried out by La Porta et al. (1998) as they did not have a
time-series element. The later study by Djankov et al. (2007) did use a time series, but relied on
a standard difference-in-differences approach to address issues of reverse causation and endo-
geneity. The use of VAR and VEC causality tests is another way of testing for endogeneity,
which takes into account the risk of false or spurious correlations which can arise in very
long time series characterized by non-stationarity. Non-stationarity is the tendency for a
time trend to move away from an established equilibrium or path as a result of an external
event (Juselius, 2006), which for present purposes could be a legal intervention or reform.
Because legal time trends and long-run ﬁnancial data are often both non-stationary (Deakin
et al., 2012), cointegration techniques involving VAR and VEC models are in principle well
suited to analysing them. Granger causality tests have previously been used in the analysis of
leximetric data (Armour et al., 2009b).
To ascertain whether the independent variable Z causes the outcome variable X, we ﬁt a
regression where X (alternative credit market variables taken one at a time in natural log) is a
function of its own past values and of past values of the control variable Y (real GDP per










πlZi;tl þ eit : ð1Þ
In ﬁtting the above equation, we have to test whether the coefﬁcients of the lags ofZ are jointly
signiﬁcant (that is, different from zero) using theWald-test statistic. The null hypothesis is that
π1 = π2 = . . . = πk = 0. If the Wald-test statistic calculated on the basis of this null hypothesis is
very high (higher than a critical value), we can say that Z causes X (rejecting the null hypoth-
esis of no causality).
Similarly, to test whether X causes Z, we ﬁt a regression where Z is a function of its past
values and the past values of X and Y and test the joint signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients of the
lags ofX. Instead of ﬁtting the equation in level terms, we can ﬁt the equation in ﬁrst-difference
terms (ΔX, ΔY and ΔZ) and their various lags. Replicating the VAR test in terms of ﬁrst-
difference, we can get a VEC causality test.
For the choice of lag (that is, how many past years are to be included in the causality test),
we use a number of criteria including the sequential modiﬁed LR test statistic (LRM), the ﬁnal
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prediction error (FPE), the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Schwarz information cri-
terion (SC), and the Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQ). Different criteria tend to
suggest different lag lengths. We have taken the maximum of the alternative lag lengths
chosen by these criteria as the order of the VAR causality tests. Subtracting one from the
order of the VAR test we get the order of the VEC test.
Results from the panel VAR and VEC causality tests (Table 2) reveal no causal relationship
between credit expansion and aggregate creditor protection scores. The same ﬁnding (namely
no causality) is valid for one component of the aggregate creditor protection index, namely the
sub-index relating to creditor protection in the area of insolvency procedures. For the two
other components of creditor protection, namely creditor protection relating to debtor
control and that relating to credit contracts, both the VAR and VEC tests show a causal
impact on credit expansion (as measured by both indicators). We can also see some evidence
of reverse causality: this suggests that credit expansion (as indicated by the two indicators con-
sidered here) can cause changes in the law relating to credit contracts. This result calls for
further investigation regarding the nature of the inﬂuence exerted by the two components
of creditor protection which are seen to have a causal impact on ﬁnancial development as mea-
sured by the ﬂow of private credit and bank credit.
4.2 Estimates of short-run and long-run relationships
We can supplement the Granger causality tests just reported by carrying out further analysis of
the impact of creditor protection on private credit using alternative dynamic panel data
models. In our causality test, we assumed that an identical relationship between the variables
prevails in each country; however, this assumption can be altered.
In a case where, as here, there is an extended time dimension to panel data, Pesaran and
Smith (1995) show that the traditional procedures for estimation of pooled models, such as
ﬁxed effects models, instrumental variables and generalized method of moments (GMM)
models, can produce inconsistent, and potentially very misleading estimates of the average
values of the parameters in dynamic panel data models unless the slope coefﬁcients are in
fact identical (Pesaran et al., 1999, p. 622). Their dynamic panel data analysis offers a
more complete set of tests for determining the nature of the relationships between institutional
and economic outcome variables over time in panels characterized by unobservable cross-
country heterogeneity. An intuitive way of thinking about this is that the models attempt to
deal with the presence of ‘unknown unknowns’ in the real-life relationships between variables.
They also make it possible to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects of a change in
one or more of the variables of interest.
We start with a postulate of a long-run relationship involving X (bank credit and private
credit, taken one at a time, in natural log), Y (real per capita GDP in natural log) and Z
(various creditor protection indexes taken one at a time):
Xit ¼ ψ iYit þ πiZit þ ηit ; ð2Þ
where i (=1, 2, 3, 4) represents the different countries, t (=1, 2, . . . T) represents periods
(years), ψi and πi are the long-run parameters and ηit is the error term.
The dynamic panel data approach enables us to establish whether there exist long-term and
short-term effects of Z (creditor protection) along with Y (per capita real GDP) on X (credit
expansion indicators) and whether there exists a stable adjustment path from the short-term
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Table 2 Causal relationships between creditor protection and credit expansion for a panel of four









(A) Inﬂuence of creditor protection on credit expansion
(i) Panel VAR causality tests








(ii) Panel VEC causality tests








Dependent variable: creditor protection Causal variable: credit
expansion
Test statistic χ2 Lag
chosen
(B) Inﬂuence of credit expansion on creditor protection
(i) Panel VAR causality tests
DEBTCL BANKCRED 7.342 8
PRIVCRED 7.242 8
CREDCONTS BANKCRED 60.68† 5
PRIVCRED 68.96† 5
INSOLV BANKCRED 11.133 8
PRIVCRED 12.551 8
ALL BANKCRED 3.237 5
PRIVCRED 5.744 5
(ii) Panel VEC causality tests
DEBTCONL BANKCRED 6.894 7
PRIVCRED 7.359 7
CREDCONTS BANKCRED 57.119† 4
PRIVCRED 64.446† 4
INSOLV BANKCRED 8.662 7
PRIVCRED 8.345 7
ALL BANKCRED 2.591 4
PRIVCRED 4.594 4
Sources: Data on legal variables are drawn from the CBR Creditor Protection for the UK, USA, France, Germany
and India. Data on bank credit and private credit are drawn from theWorld Bank’sWorld Development Indicators.
DEBTCL, laws on debtor control; CREDCONT, laws on credit contracts; INSOLV, laws on insolvency
procedures; ALL, aggregate creditor protection; BANKCRED, ratio of bank credit (lending by banks) to GDP;
PRIVCRED, ratio of private credit (lending to the private sector) to GDP.
†Null hypothesis of no causality is rejected at 5% level.
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relationship (if any) to the long-run relationship. Following Pesaran et al. (1999), our panel
data analysis is based on the following error correction representation:









πilΔZi;tl þ μi þ ϕit; ð3Þ
where Δ is the difference operator, θi is the country-speciﬁc error-correcting speed of adjust-
ment term, λij,ψik and πij are the coefﬁcients of the lagged variables, μi is the country ﬁxed
effect and φit is the disturbances term. The existence of a meaningful long-run relationship
with a stable adjustment dynamics requires that θi < 0.
Within this general structure, there are three alternative models, which build in different
assumptions about cross-country heterogeneity. At one extreme, we can use a dynamic
ﬁxed effect estimator (DFE) in which intercepts are allowed to vary across the countries,
but all other parameters and error variances are constrained to be the same. At the other
extreme, we can estimate separate equations for each country and calculate the mean of the
estimates. This is the mean group estimator (MG). The intermediate alternative is the pooled
mean group (PMG) estimator. This model allows intercepts, short-run coefﬁcients and error
variances to differ freely across the countries but constrains the long-run coefﬁcients to be the
same; that means, ψi = ψ and πi = π for all i while θi may differ from group to group.
Using the STATAmodel developed by Blackburne and Frank (2007), we can estimate each
of the three alternative models. We use the Lag Exclusion Wald Test for each variable separ-
ately to determine the lag structure which is represented as (p, q, r).3
Both the MG and DFE models show no short-term or long-term effect of aggregate cred-
itor protection on any indicator of credit expansion. The PMGmodel, however, shows a nega-
tive long-term effect of the aggregate score on the two indicators of credit expansion but there
exists no stable adjustment path from the short-term (positive relationship in one case and no
relationship in another case) to the long-term (Table 3A). Hausman tests support the DFE
model, so the PMG result needs to be treated with caution.
Two models (PMG and DFE) show long-term positive effects of creditor protection relat-
ing to debtor control on both indicators of credit expansion there is, however, no short-term
effect. It is only in the DFE model that we see evidence of an adjustment process from an in-
signiﬁcant short-term effect to a signiﬁcant positive long-term effect: here the adjustment path
is stable for both indicators of credit expansion. The Hausman test, which enables us to iden-
tify which of the models is statistically preferred, supports the DFE model for the case of the
private credit–GDP ratio (Table 3B). The selection of the DFE model as the most statistically
robust implies that short-run and long-run effects are homogenous across the countries in our
sample.
As regards the impact of creditor protection relating to credit contracts, we see the opposite
result: two models (PMG and DFE) show long-term negative effects of credit contracts (with
no signiﬁcant short-term effect) on both the indicators of credit expansion. In each case, the
Hausman test supports the DFE model, which shows a stable adjustment process from no
short-term relationship to a negative long-term relationship (Table 3C).
3 We have used a uniform lag-structure for all the countries, as the STATA model used here does not
provide the option of doing otherwise. It is theoretically possible to consider different lag structures for
different countries on the basis of some information criteria.
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Table 3 Short-run and long-run impacts of creditor protection on credit expansion, 1970–2005:
dynamic panel models
Independent variables PMG model MG model DFE model
(A) Short-run and long-run effects of aggregate creditor protection (ALL)
(i) Dependent variable: bank credit
Long-term relationship
GDP 1.855*** 1.629*** 1.898***
ALL −6.738** −2.321 −2.859
Short-term relationship
θ −0.291 −0.519** −0.27***
ΔGDPt 0.159 0.136 0.344
ΔGDPt−1 −0.751 −0.836 −0.034
ΔALLt 2.713** 1.266 0.899
µ −3.014 −3.8*** −3.423***
Chosen model MG
(ii) Dependent variable: private credit
Long-term relationship
GDP 1.916*** 0.725** 1.237
ALL −7.674*** 5.781 3.483
Short-term relationship
θ 0.276 0.477 0.218***
ΔGDPt 1.349 1.099 0.321
ΔGDPt−1 0.386*** 0.316*** −0.135
ΔALLt −3.396 −1.618 −1.047
µ 3.003 2.739 2.174
Chosen model DFE
(B) Short-run and long-run effects of debtor control laws (DEBTCL)
(i) Dependent variable: bank credit
Long-term relationship
GDP 0.652*** 1.05*** 1.104***
DEBTCL 4.738*** 3.373 1.923***
Short-term relationship
θ −0.368 −0.644*** −0.36***
ΔGDPt −0.192 −0.285 0.283
ΔGDPt−1 −0.439 −0.725 0.232
ΔDEBTCLt 0.548 −0.253*** −0.082
µ −1.518 −5.285*** −2.669***
Chosen model PMG
(ii) Dependent variable: private credit
Long-term relationship
GDP 0.429* 1.017*** 1.14***
DEBTCL 3.294** 3.037 2.198***
Short-term relationship
θ −0.314 −0.441* −0.327***
ΔGDPt −0.263 −0.295 0.502
ΔGDPt−1 −0.561 −0.661 0.487
ΔDEBTCLt 0.933 0.098 −0.277
µ −0.394 −3.195** −2.652**
Chosen model DFE
Continued
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Table 3 Continued
Independent variables PMG model MG model DFE model
(C) Short-run and long-run effects of credit contract laws (CREDCONT)
(i) Dependent variable: bank credit
Long-term relationship
GDP 1.131*** 0.932*** 1.647***
CREDCONT −1.986** −4.407 −3.811***
Short-term relationship
θ −0.32* −0.616*** −0.309***
ΔBANKCREDt−1 0.149 0.194* −0.24***
ΔGDPt −0.001 −1.122* 0.506
ΔGDPt−1 −0.568 −0.527 −0.002
ΔCREDCONTt 0.229 1.351* 0.7
µ −1.742* −0.661 −2.85***
Chosen model DFE
(ii) Dependent variable: private credit
Long-term relationship
GDP 1.128*** 1.014*** 1.761***
CREDCONT −2.747*** −5.089 −4.579***
Short-term relationship
θ −0.306 −0.564*** −0.274***
ΔPRIVCREDt−1 0.027 −0.009 −0.299***
ΔGDPt −0.137 −1.159* 0.837
ΔGDPt−1 −0.966 −0.581 0.194
ΔCREDCONTt 0.419 3.05 0.544
µ −1.563 0.212 −2.746**
Chosen model4 DFE
(D) Short-run and long-run effects of laws on insolvency procedures (INSOLV)
(i) Dependent variable: bank credit
Long-term relationship
GDP 1.309*** 1.287*** 1.713***
INSOLV −3.28*** −0.474 −1.498
Short-term relationship
θ −0.466* −0.485** −0.274***
ΔGDPt 0.086 −0.099 0.323
ΔGDPt−1 −0.573 −0.788 0.043
ΔINSOLVt 1.254 0.827 0.245
µ −3.115* −2.774** −3.192***
Chosen model DFE
(ii) Dependent variable: private credit
Long-term relationship
GDP 1.536*** 2.911** 1.879***
INSOLV −4.549*** −17.314 −1.955
Short-term relationship
θ −0.379* −0.375 −0.248***
ΔGDPt 0.245 −0.192 0.583
ΔGDPt−1 −0.538 −0.756 0.224
ΔINSOLVt 0.685 0.379 −0.109
Continued
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The PMG model shows that the long-term impact of creditor protection relating to insolv-
ency procedures is negative on both indicators of credit market development and that there
exists a stable adjustment process from an insigniﬁcant short-term relationship to long-term
negative relationship. Neither theMGmodel nor the DFEmodel shows a signiﬁcant short-term
or long-term effect. However, the Hausman test again supports the DFE model (Table 3, Part
D), so this result cannot be regarded as deﬁnitive.
5. Discussion
Analysing the available data of four OECD countries over a long time span, 1970–2005, our
study ﬁnds no clear verdict in favour of the proposition that the common law countries provide
for a higher overall level of protection of creditors across the different types of legal regimewhich
can be used to safeguard creditor rights. The civil law countries (France and Germany) provide
more creditor protection relating to the issue of debtor control; the common law countries (UK
and USA) provide stronger creditor protection in the ﬁelds of credit contracts and insolvency
procedures.
On the proposition that ‘law matters’, we ﬁnd no clear evidence in favour of a positive effect
of aggregate creditor protection on private or bank credit. Using dynamic panel data modelling,
however, we ﬁnd that different components of creditor protection law do matter, but, that they
have different effects on private and bank credit. Increases in the debtor control component of
creditor protection, which is more strongly present in the civil-law countries, have a long-term
positive effect on credit expansion. In contrast, increases in the credit contract aspect of creditor
protection, which is more prevalent in common law countries, have a long-term negative effect.
Table 3 Continued
Independent variables PMG model MG model DFE model
µ −3.208* −1.866** −3.293**
Chosen model DFE
Sources: Data on legal variables are drawn from the CBR Creditor Protection for the UK, USA, France, Germany
and India. Data on bank credit and private credit are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators.
Notes: The regressors are estimated from the following long-term relationship and its error correction form.
Long-run relationship:
Xit ¼ ψ iYit þ πiZit þ ηit :
Error correction form:









πilΔZi;tl þ μi þ ϕit ;
where Δ is the difference operator, θi is the group-speciﬁc error-correcting speed of adjustment term, λij,ψik and πij
are the coefﬁcients of the lagged variables, μi is the country-speciﬁc effect and φit is the disturbances term. The
existence of a meaningful long-run relationship with a stable adjustment dynamics requires θi < 0. Real per
capita GDP in purchasing power parity constant (2005) US dollar. Credit market variables and Per capita
GDP are in natural log. An appropriate model is chosen on the basis of a series of Hausman tests.
DEBTCL, laws on debtor control; CREDCONT, laws on credit contracts; INSOLV, laws on insolvency
procedures; ALL, aggregate creditor protection; BANKCRED, ratio of bank credit (lending by banks) to GDP;
PRIVCRED, ratio of private credit (lending to the private sector) to GDP.
* Signiﬁcant at 10 per cent level. ** Signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level. *** Signiﬁcant at 1 per cent level.
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The ﬁnding that different aspects of creditor protection laws may have different effects on
credit expansion has implications for bankruptcy law reform. Rules which our index charac-
terizes in terms of debtor control are those which are imposed by law on active ﬁrms for the pro-
tection of third party creditors. They constrain options on capital structure in various ways, for
example by requiring ﬁrms to have a minimum of paid up capital and by limiting their options to
pay dividends out of retained earnings. Other examples of laws of this kind are those which
impose duties on directors to have regard to the interests of creditors as the ﬁrm approaches in-
solvency, and which allow the court to pierce the veil of corporate personality in order to protect
creditors. A common thread running through these laws is that they tilt the balance of power
away from shareholders and incumbent managers, and towards creditors, while the ﬁrm is a
going concern. Thus one reading of our analysis is that the law can increase the supply of
credit by strengthening the position of creditors in distributional conﬂicts within the ﬁrm.
Laws of the type that the CBR index describes in terms of credit contract rights are those
which enable creditors to protect their rights through transactional devices of various kinds
which are triggered when the ﬁrm is in, or is approaching, insolvency. For example, these rules
include the laws governing the use of the ﬁrm’s assets as collateral, and the ease with which
creditors can enforce security interests. They mostly operate when the ﬁrm has ceased, or is in
danger of ceasing, to be a going concern. The ﬁnding that laws of this kind have a dampening
or negative effect on private credit suggests that laws strengthening creditors’ security rights
may depress demand for credit, as managers and shareholders ﬁnd the terms onwhich security
rights are enforced to be excessively onerous.
A relevant factor in our results is the nature of our sample, which consists of industrialized
countries with mature banking and corporate systems. It is in this speciﬁc context that the add-
ition of new rights to secured creditors may tip the law beyond the point where ﬁrms regard the
granting of collateral as an acceptable trade-off for access to ﬁnance. Other work has shown
that extending the rights of secured creditors may lead to an increase in private credit in coun-
tries where banking systems are less highly developed, and that legal support for collateral may
therefore be important in stimulating bank-based lending, such as former socialist countries in
central and Eastern Europe (Haselmann et al., 2010). Our own different ﬁndings suggest that
this result may be speciﬁc to the experience of transition systems.
Our results can be put in the context of the wider debate over the relevance of legal origins
to an understanding of different varieties of capitalism. Legal origin theory claims that under-
lying legal forces help to shape outcomes and determine cross-national variations across
market systems (La Porta et al., 2008). The evidence we have presented here suggests that
legal origin may help to explain features of some systems which are often taken to typify a
given legal family (England and France, in the case of the common law and civil law, respect-
ively), but it also shows that other systems among large industrial economies do not conform
to their legal-origin type (Germany and the USA). If legal origin does have some residual effect
on the pathway of legal and economic change, the case of insolvency law suggests that it is not
a very strong one: US bankruptcy law diverged radically from its English ‘parent’ in the course
of the nineteenth century, while the inﬂuence of the courts on the English law of insolvency has
recently been in decline, as legislation has re-aligned the relationship between the management
of the ﬁrm and its creditors in favour of the former.
The VOC approach is based on the notion of complementarities across institutions of dif-
ferent types, including those characteristic of different forms of ﬁnancing of business ﬁrms
(Hall and Soskice, 2001), rather than on the type of mono-causal explanation posited by
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legal origin theory (La Porta et al., 2008). On the basis of the evidence we have presented,
insolvency law represents a context in which a multi-causal, non-linear approach to the under-
standing of comparative capitalisms looks more plausible than the identiﬁcation of a single
overriding cause of national differences.
6. Conclusion
Legal origin studies maintain that a higher level of creditor protection, which is characteristic
of common law countries, leads to increased levels of private credit and bank lending
(Djankov et al., 2007; La Porta et al., 2008). In this article, we have presented evidence
from the CBR’s Creditor Protection Index which measures legal support for creditor rights
between 1970 and 2005, replicating the period analysed in Djankov et al. (2007), but with
amore detailed coverage of relevant laws. Taking an in-depth look at four developed countries
(France, Germany, the UK and the USA) permits us to put these legal data in context.
We ﬁnd that common law countries do not provide, in aggregate, a higher level of legal
protection for creditors than civil law ones. The picture is different when we consider different
components of creditor protection, however. Then we ﬁnd that laws controlling the activities
of active ﬁrms in order to minimize the risk of default—debtor control laws—are stronger in
the civil law, while laws enabling creditors to use transactional devices to protect their security
interests at the point of insolvency or liquidation—credit contract laws—are stronger in the
common law.
When we carry out a longitudinal panel data analysis of the relationship between creditor
protection and the extent of private credit in national economies, we ﬁnd that debtor control
laws are associated with a long-run enhancement of private and bank credit, whereas credit
contract laws have an opposite effect. We interpret this result as throwing light on the different
corporate governance dynamics involved in the operation of laws protecting creditor rights.
Debtor control laws are largely about shifting the balance of power within the ﬁrm from share-
holders to creditors while the ﬁrm is a going concern, and thereby operate to increase the
supply of debt ﬁnance to ﬁrms. In contrast, credit contract laws give external creditors en-
hanced power over the managers of the ﬁrm by enabling them to seize corporate assets in
the event of default. Laws of this kind, once they pass a certain threshold, depress the
demand for credit, hence the negative correlation we ﬁnd between reforms strengthening
secured creditors’ rights and the extent of private credit in advanced industrial economies.
There are limitations inherent in our approach and scope for further analysis. Focusing on
a few countries and examining their cases in detail may be at least as revealing, and perhaps
more so, than engaging in cross-national studies involving over 100 countries, but the results
obtained here could be tested in future by extending the detailed data set we have employed, to
cover more countries.
We used regressionmodelswhich did not present an over-complicated picture of the relation-
ship between institutions and economic growth. The merit of this approach is that relationship
between the causal and outcome variables is clear from the design of the regression equation,
and controls are kept to a minimum. There is scope to include additional institutional variables
in this type of analysis in future, although bearing inmind the presence of trade-offs between the
quantity of information contained in a regression and the clarity and robustness of the results.
Our results raise theoretical and conceptual issues for future research.We see little evidence
in our study to support the mono-causal claim that path-dependent legal origin effects are the
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root causes of cross-national differences. If there is a legal origin effect which associates the
judge-made common law with a particular approach to the constitution and regulation of
markets, it is a very weak and attenuated one. It is more plausible to think of complementar-
ities between certain legal institutions and distinct national pathways to industrialization.
Although only a few studies have so far explicitly linked the VOC approach to the legal
origin hypothesis (Pistor, 2005; Ahlering and Deakin, 2007), this is an issue which should
repay further analysis.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to three anonymous referees for comments and suggestions for improvement.We are
also grateful for funding from the ESRC Rising Powers Programme (project ES/J012491/1, Law,
Development and Finance in Rising Powers), and the Cambridge University Humanities Research
Grants Scheme.
References
Acharya, A., Amihud, Y. and Litov, L. (2009) Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk Taking, NBER
Working Paper No. 15569, Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ahlering, B. and Deakin, S. (2007) ‘Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A
Case of Institutional Complementarity?’, Law & Society Review, 41, 865–908.
Armour, J. and Bennett, H. (2003)Vulnerable Transactions in Corporate Insolvency, Oxford, Hart.
Armour, J., Deakin, S., Sarkar, P., Siems, M. and Singh, A. (2009a) ‘Shareholder Protection and
Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis’, Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies, 6, 343–380.
Armour, J., Deakin, S., Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2009b) ‘HowDo Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from
a Cross-National Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection’, American
Journal of Comparative Law, 57, 579–629.
Balz, M. (1997) ‘Market Conformity of Insolvency Proceedings: Policy Issues of the German
Insolvency Law’, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 23, 167.
Belcher, C. (1997)Corporate Rescue: AConceptual Approach to Insolvency Law, London, Sweet&
Maxwell.
Blackburne, E. and Frank, M. (2007) ‘Estimation of Non-stationary Heterogeneous Panels’, Stata
Journal, 7, 197–208.
Botero, J., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2004) ‘The Regulation of
Labour’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 1339–1382.
Buchanan, J., Chai, D. H. and Deakin, S. (2013) ‘Empirical Analysis of Legal Institutions and
Institutional Change: Multiple-Methods Approaches and Their Application to Corporate
Governance Research’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 10, 1–20.
Cools, S. (2005) ‘The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental
Europe: Distribution of Powers’, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 30, 697–766.
Deakin, S. (2012) ‘The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and
Sustainability in the Business Enterprise’, Queen’s Law Journal, 37, 339–381.
Deakin, S., Sarkar, P. and Singh, A. (2012) ‘An End to Consensus? The Selective Impact of Corporate
Law Reform on Financial Development’. In Aoki, M., Binmore, K., Deakin, S. and Gintis, H. (eds)
Complexity and Institutions: Markets, Norms and Organizations, Basingstoke, Palgrave,
pp. 189–213.
Dennis, V. and Fox, A. (2004) The New Law of Insolvency: Insolvency Act 1986 to Enterprise Act
2002, London, Law Society.
24 S. Deakin et al.
Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2003) ‘The New
Comparative Economics’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, 595–619.
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C. and Shleifer, A. (2007) ‘Private Credit in 129 Countries’, Journal of
Financial Economics, 84, 299–329.
Eidenmüller, H. (2006) ‘Trading in Times of Crisis: Formal Insolvency Proceedings, Workouts
and the Incentives for Shareholders/Managers’, European Business Organization Law Review,
7, 239–258.
Elliott, M. (2000) ‘Is the Harmonisation of Laws a Practical Solution to the Problems of
Cross-border Insolvency?’, Corporate Rescue and Insolvency Journal, 16, 116.
Finch, V. (2009) ‘The Dynamics of Insolvency Law: Three Models of Reforms’, Law and Financial
Markets Review, 3, 438–445.
Goode, R. (2011) Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell.
Gross, K. (1994) ‘Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay’,Washington
University Law Quarterly, 72, 1031–1048.
Hall, P. A. and Soskice, D. (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of
Comparative Advantage, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press.
Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. (2001) ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, Georgetown
Law Journal, 89, 439–468.
Haselmann, R., Pistor, K. and Vig, V. (2010) ‘How Law Affects Lending’, Review of Financial
Studies, 23, 549–580.
Hautcoeur, P. and Di Martino, P. (2013) ‘The Functioning of Bankruptcy Law and Practices in
European Perspective (ca. 1880–1913)’, Enterprise and Society, 14, 579–605.
Houston, J., Lin, C., Lin, P. and Ma, Y. (2010) ‘Creditor Rights, Information Sharing, and Bank
Risk Taking’, Journal of Financial Economics, 96, 485–512.
Jackson, T. (1982) ‘Bankruptcy, Non-bankruptcy, Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain’, Yale
Law Journal, 91, 857–907.
Jackson, T. (1986) The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press.
Juselius, K. (2006) The Cointegrated VAR Model, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Kilborn, J. (2009) ‘The Raging Debate between Territorial and Universal Theories of Value Sharing
in International Bankruptcy’. In Wessells, B., Markell, B. and Kilborn, J. (eds) International
Cooperation in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Matters: On the Origins, Development and Future
of Communication and Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency Cases, Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
Klerman, D., Spamann, H. andWeinstein,M. (2011) ‘Legal Origin or Colonial History?’, Journal of
Legal Analysis, 3, 379–409.
Korobkin, D. (1993) ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’, Texas
Law Review, 71, 541.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997) ‘Legal Determinants of
External Finance’, Journal of Finance, 52, 1131–1150.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1998) ‘Law and Finance’, Journal of
Political Economy, 106, 1113–1155.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2008) ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal
Origins’, Journal Economic Literature, 46, 285–332.
Lee, S.-H., Peng, W. and Barney, J. (2007) ‘Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship Development: A
Real Options Perspective’, Academy of Management Review, 32, 257–272.
Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2007) ‘Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach’, Journal of
Corporate Law Studies, 7, 17–50.
Levine, R. (1997) ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda’, Journal of
Economic Literature, 35, 688–726.
Varieties of creditor protection 25
Mann, B. (2002) Republic of Debtors. Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence,
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Mahoney, P. (2001) ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: HayekMight be Right’, Journal of
Legal Studies, 30, 503–525.
McCormack, G. (2006) ‘Swelling Corporate Assets: Changing What Is on the Menu’, Journal of
Corporate Law Studies, 6, 39–69.
Mevorach, I. (2011) ‘Transaction Avoidance in Bankruptcy of Corporate Groups’, European
Company and Financial Law Review, 8, 235–258.
Milhaupt, C. and Pistor, K. (2008) Law & Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal About Legal
Systems and Economic Development Around the World, Chicago and London, University of
Chicago Press.
Miller, S. (1998) ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil among Afﬁliated Companies in the European
Community and in the US: A Comparative Analysis of US, German and UK Veil-piercing
Approaches’, American Business Law Journal, 36, 73–149.
Mokal, R. (2001) ‘The Authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism, Creditors’ Bargain and
Corporate Liquidation’, Legal Studies, 21, 400–443.
North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
Ottolenghi, S. (1990) ‘From Peeping Behind the Corporate Veil to Ignoring It Completely’,Modern
Law Review, 53, 338–353.
Pesaran, M. H. and Smith, R. (1995) ‘Estimating Long-Run Relationships from Dynamic
Heterogeneous Panels’, Journal of Econometrics, 68, 79–113.
Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y. and Smith, R. (1999) ‘Pooled Mean Group Estimation of Dynamic
Heterogeneous Panels’, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 94, 621–634.
Pistor, K. (2005) ‘Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies’, ECGI
Law-Working Paper No. 30/2005.
Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. (2003) ‘TheGreat Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the
Twentieth Century’, Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 5–50.
Ratford, W. and Smith, R. (1985) A Guide to the Insolvency Act 1985, London, Financial Training
Publications.
Schillig, M. (2014) ‘Corporate Insolvency Law in the Twenty-First Century: State Imposed or
Market Based?’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 14, 1–38.
Siems, M. (2014) Comparative Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Thompson, R. (1991) ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study’, Cornell Law Review, 76,
1036–1074.
Uttamchandani, M. (2004) ‘Insolvency Law and Practice in Europe’s Transition Economies’,
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, 11, 452–456.
Warren, E. (1987) ‘Bankruptcy Policy’, University of Chicago Law Review, 54, 775.
Weber, M. (2013) Economy and Society, Berkeley, University of California Press.
Westbrook, J. (2004) ‘The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy’, Texas Law Review, 82, 795–855.
Wood, P. (1997) Maps of the World Financial Law, London, Allen & Overy.
Wood, P. (2008) The Law and Practice of International Finance, London, Sweet & Maxwell.
26 S. Deakin et al.
